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But we have said far more than we purposed when we began.
We have shown, we trust, need enough of a higher standard of
professional honor and principle, as well as practice, and some of
the more embarrassing obstacles in the way of any effectual reform, so long as the public demand these debasing and degrading
services at the hands of the profession. But it is something to
say of our profession, that it is no worse than other departments
of work and life in the country, and certainly no worse than the
I. F. R.
people desire it to be.
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HENRY BAKER v. SAME.
The fact that, when a resident of a city was injured by reason of a defective
way, which the city was bound to keep in repair, he was driving at a C9faster rate
than six miles an hour," in violation of a city ordinance, is no bar to his right
to recover damages for such injury, if such driving did not in any degree contribute to produce it.
The fact that the jury failed to agree upon the answer to the question whether
the plaintiff was driving at a faster rate than six miles an hour, does not render
itreasonably certain that a general verdict for the plaintiff, in such action, is
erroneous.

Tiris was an action on the case, for an injury occasioned
by a defective highway. The plaintiffs suffered serious damage
in person and property on the evening of October 13th 1868,
by reason of the upsetting of the carriage in which they were
riding, in consequence of running over certain piles of stones
which had been dumped in the roadway on Cumberland street,
by persons in the employ of the street commissioner, and left
there over night, without guards or lights, to protect or warn the
traveller. The buggy and harness were well made and in good
order, the horse well broken and kind, though spirited, the street
much frequented, and the evening too dark for a man in a carriage to see obstacles of that description on the ground.
H. Baker testified that he was driving not over five miles an
hour, when the accident occurred. The defendants offered
evidence tending to show that he was driving at a rate exceeding
six miles an hour.
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There was a city ordinance prohibiting driving at a faster rate
than six miles an hour, under a penalty of not less than five, nor
more than twenty dollars.
The presiding judge instructed the jury, that if plaintiffs were
driving at a faster rate than six miles an hour, when thrown from
the carriage, yet if such driving did not in any degree contribute
to produce the injuries complained of, it would be no bar to
their right to recover.
The case now came before this court on exceptions by defendants to this instruction, and also on motions to set aside the
verdict twhich was'for the plaintiffs) as against law and evidence.
Davis I .Drummond, for plaintiffs.
,T. W. Symonds, City Solicitor, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BARROWS', J.-Counsel for the defendants cite a strong line
of cases, in which our own and other courts have held city
ordinances of this and like character, as binding on all who have
actual or constructive notice of their existence, and as having
the force of statute law within the limits to which they apply.
And also cases in which it appears to have been held with more
or less distinctness, that a party seeking a remedy in damages
against a town or city or other corporation, charged with the
maintenance of a way or bridge, is not entitled to recover, if at
the time of the accident, the party plaintiff was violating a law
of.which he was bound to take notice.
But in all this latter class of cases, it will be seen upon examination that the wrongful act of the plaintiffs either was, or was
assumed to be, in some manner or degree, contributory to the
production of the injury complained of, so that the precise question here presented was not under consideration in any of them.
They cannot be deemed authorities adverse to the instruction
here given, if the point was not raised or considered. Thus in
Heland v. Lowell, 3 Allen 407, it seems to have been taken for
granted on all hands, that the plaintiff's want of care, evinced
in the violation of the city ordinance, was one of the efficient
causes of the accident. There may have been something in the
evidence which made it cdrtain that it was so, in which case it
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would be useless to raise or discuss the question which we are to
pass upon. At all events the point was not taken, and the
questions presented to the court were whether the plaintiff was
bound by the ordinance, if it was not made to appear that he
knew of its existence, and whether evidence of his general good
character for sobriety was admissible, to rebut the evidence
offered in defence that he was intoxicated when the accident
occurred. The rulings complained of were the rejection of the
evidence of general good character for sobriety, and the instruction, "that if the plaintiff at the time of receiving the injury was
driving at a rate faster than a walk, in violation of the city ordinance, he could not recover, although he was using due care in
other respects." It seems from the very tenor of the instruction,
to have been conceded on the part of the plaintiff, that under the
circumstances of that case, driving faster than a walk was not
the "due care," which the plaintiff was bound to show he was
using in all respects.
The court recite a dictum from Worcester v. -Essex Merrimac
Bridge Corp., 7 Gray 459, to the effect that if the plaintiff was, at
the time of the accident, violating a public statute or a by-law,
of which he had actual or constructive notice, he could not
recover damages for the accident; but they immediately refer to
the true principle, adding: " and it is the established law, that
when a plaintiff's own unlawful act concurs in causing the
damage that he complains of, he cannot recover compensation
for such damage," It is very clear that the court could not have
meant that a concurrence merely in point of time between a
breach of law by the plaintiff and the accident, would bar the
right of the plaintiff to recover, because they bad just said in
Alger v. Lowell, 3 Allen 406, that "intoxicated persons are not
removed from all protection of law; the plaintiff was bound to
show that he was in the exercise of due care and the jury were so
instructed; if he used such care by himself or others, his intoxication had nothing to do with the accident; the city may be liable
under some circumstances for an injury sustained by * * * an
intoxicated person, if the condition of the injured person does
not contribute in any degree to occasion the injury."
N'ow intoxication in the streets is a misdemeanqr, upon which a
penalty is imposed by law, as distinctly as it is by the city
ordinance upon driving over a bridge faster than a walk, and it
VOL. XIX.-36

BAER v. CITY OF PORTLAND.

appears as likely to contribute to the occurrence of an accident,
to say the least of it; yet no one would be likely to contend that
a city or town would be relieved from the consequences of its
negligence in the care of its ways, merely because the sufferer
was intoxicated at the time of the accident, if it were made to
appear that his breach of the law, in that respect, had nothing to
do with its occurrence. It has been settled that intoxication is
not conclusive evidence of a want of ordinary care: Stuart v.
Machia8 Port, 48 Maine 477. In fine, recrimination is not a
good plea in bar in actions of this kind, unless the plaintiff's claim
originates in his offence, and he is obliged to prove the offence in
order to establish his claim, or unless the commission of the
offence has in some degree contributed to produce the injury,
or necessarily negatives some point which the plaintiff is bound to
establish in proof, in order to entitle him to a verdict.
The defendants' counsel contends that the simple fact that the
plaintiff is in the act of violating the law, at 'the time of the
injury, is a bar to the right of recovery. Undoubtedly there are
many cases where the contemporaneous violation of the law by
the plaintiff is so connected with his claim for damages, as to
preclude his recovery; but to lay down such a rule as the counsel claims, and to disregard the distinction implied in the ruling
of which he complains, would be productive oftentimes of palpable
injustice. The fact that a party plaintiff in an action of this
description was at the time of the injury passing another wayfarer on the wrong side of the street or without giving him half
the road, or that he was travelling on runners without bells in
contravention of the statute, or that he was smoking a cigar in
the sireets, in violation of a municipal ordinance, while it might
subject the offender to a penalty, will not excuse the town for. a
neglect to make its ways safe and convenient for travellers, if the
commission of the plaintiff's offence did not in any degree
contribute to produce 'the injury of which he complains.
The soundness of the distinction recognised by the presiding
judge in the instruction now under consideration, has been
affirmed by this court in Bigelow v. Reed, 51 Maine 325,
Hamilton v. Goding, 55 Maine 428, 429. See also Horton v.
Gloater, 46 Maine 520, Davis v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 548.
But the defendants' counsel insists that "the finding by the
jury, that the illegal driving did not contribute to the injury, was
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unwarranted by the testimony," and argues that a change in the
rate of speed must necessarily increase or diminish the danger,
while "the verdict practically holds that the danger would be the
same at a rate of less than six miles, as it would be at a rate of
more than six miles an hour," inasmuch as the jury declared
themselves unable to agree whether the plaintiff was driving at
the rate of more than six miles. Is it reasonably certain, then,
that the verdict must have been erroneous, because the jury
failed to agree upon the answer to the question, whether the
plaintiff was driving at a rate exceeding six miles an hour?
Suppose half the jury thought the plaintiff was driving at the
rate of six miles and an eighth per hour, and the other half
thought his speed did not exceed six miles. They would not
agree upon the special finding; but would that prevent them
from finding that the rate of speed, whichever of the two rates
it was, did not contribute to produce the injury? Might they
not well have found upon the testimony here presented, that if the
plaintiff was driving at a rate not exceeding five miles an hour,
as he testified, the same results, to wit, the frightening the horse,
his starting to run; and the upsetting of the carriage would have
followed? If so, did it really make any difference as to the issue
then on trial if he was going more than six miles an hour? We
think the answer to these questions must demonstrate the injustice of making such a test decisive of the plaintiff's right to
recover. The true question was (on this part of the case)
whether he was using due and reasonable care under all the
circumstances, or whether a want of such care on his part contributed to produce the injury.
We have no reason to doubt that this question was submitted
to the jury, in a manner calculated to give to the testimony
offered by the defendants as to the plaintiff's rate of speed, all its
legitimate effect, or that it was passed upon by them in a manner
which must preclude our interference with the conclusion to which
they arrived. In each case the entry must be
Motion and exceptions overruled.
The cases are probably not altogether
harmonious in regard to the effect of
illegality in a contract or business, upon
the right to recover upon any matter
merely incidental to the main contract

or business. It seems well agreed, that
ifthe action is based upon any matter
which is in violation of law, whether it
it be also contra bonos mores or not, it
cannot be maintained. There was for-
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merli an attempt to distinguish, in this
r9spect, betwVeen mala prohibita and
mala in se, as if contracts against positive law merely were not to be *held
illekal, to the saeine extent as if they
involvedl alsb positive moral turpitude.
There seems to have beeta an opinion
somewhat extensively prevalent among
men of the better class in our country,
that if one peaceably submitted to endare the penalty of a statute, he -had
answered all the law required of him,
and that he thereby obtained full pardon
and absolution for his violation of the
law. For instance, if in his conscience
he'felt the law to be in conflict -with any
higher law, zs the constitution of the
state, or the Divine law, he was at full
liberty to act upon his own impulses, or
convictions, and incurred no moral
guilt provided he submitted to pay or
I
endure the penalty.
Upon a somewhat similar view, it
seems, at one time, to have been considered that Sunday laws, or those requiring abstinence from ordinary seeular
labor on the Lord's Day, did not render
contra6ts made in violation of the
statute void, but only exposed the parties to the penalty of the statute: Geer
v. Putnam, ID Mass. 312; 2 Parsons dn Cant. 762. But later cases
have .placed the question upon the true
ground, that the effect of the statute
must be to render all acts done in violation of the statute void for all purposes,
so that no action could be maintained
upon any contract made in violation
of these statutes: Lyon v. Strong, 6 Vt.
219; Robeson v. French, 12 Met. 24;
Gregg v. Wyman, 4 Cush. 322. And
the same rule has been extended -to
sales of property in violation of statutory regulations as to inspection, license,
and stamping. As in actions for the
iecovery of the price of lottery tickets
sold in violation of statutes: Hunt v.
Knickerbacker, 5 Johns. 327 ; or for the
enforcement of contracts for the sale of

lands where a penalty was inflicted by
statute: Mitchell v. Smith, I Binn. 110;
or where the statute prohibited, under a
penalty, the selling of shingles unless
of a particular dimension or if not sbrveyed, and the action was for the recovery of the price of shingles sold in
violation of the' statute: Wheeler v.
Russell, 17 Mass. 258. Cases of
this character are very numerous in the
reports, and need not be discussed.
It seems, however, in all this class
of cases to be considered, that in order
to defeat the action, it must appear that
it is some way founded upon, or in
furtherance of the illegality. Thus, a
contract founded upon the consideration
of future cohabitation is held void, as
being against public morals : Walker V.
Perkins, 3 Burr. 1568; S. a. I Win.
Bl. 517. But contracts founded upon
past illicit cohabitation, even where one
of the parties is married, have been
upheld: Turner v. Vaughn, 2 Will.
339; Walker v. Perkins, supra; Hill
v. Spencer, Arnb. 641 ; Kaye v. Moore,
2 Sim. & Stu. 260; Nye v. Moreley, 6
B. & C. 133.
But where a party contributes to the
maintenance of anything prohibited by
law, or against the policy of the law,
as where one lets lodgings to an immodest woman to enable her to carry on
illicit cohabitation there, with different
men, he cannot recover the rent. But
if the woman merely lodge there and
receives her visitors elsewhere, it is
here said he may recover the rent:
Appleton v. Campbell, 2 C. & P. 347.
So, also, he cannot recover in iuch case,
although at the time of letting the
plaintiff did not know of the use to
which the tenant purposed to put the
lodgings, if he suffers her to occupy
them after he learns the use: J'ennings
v. Throgmorton, IR. & M. 251 ; Lloyd v.
Johinston, 1 B. & P. 340. And it seems
to have been held, that one may recover
for getting up an expensive dress to be
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worn by a woman of bad fame, at public places, in furtherance of her vicious
mode of life, even when the plaintiff
knew the use for which it was intended
beforehand: Lloyd v. .Johnston, I B. &
P. 340. But we should hare doubted
the entire soundness of the last case on
this point. And Lord ELLESrnOROUGII
seems to have held, in Bowry v. Bennet,
1 Cowp. 348, that in such case the
plaintiff cannot recover, where the
work is done to forward prostitution,
and to be paid out of the avails of such
a course of life. And it has been held,
that where houses have been leased for
brothels, the lessor knowing the use
contemplated, no recovery could be
had upon the covenants in the lease:
Smith v. White, Law Rep. I Eq. 626.
And although, as stated above, at one
time it seems to have been held that the
plaintiff must expect to derive some
advantage from the illegality, in order
to defeat the action, that is not now
held important: Pearce v. Brooks, Law
Rep. I Exch. 213. Anything done in
furtherance of a business carried on in
violation of law, can never be made
the foundation of an action. As where
the action was for services rendered in
peddling goods for another, without
license as required by law : Stewartson
v. Lothrop, 12 Gray 52. Nor is the
agent of another, in performing an
illegal act, liable to an action at the
suit of his principal, for damages recovered against him on account of the
negligence of the agent: Baynard v.
Hrrity, 1 Houston 200. But it would
be otherwise if the business had been
rendered illegal by the omission of the
agent to obtain the proper license,
which his principal confided in him to
do: Id. And a woman cannot recover
upon an implied contract for services
performed by her as servant for a man
with whom she lived as a mistress:
WTalraven v. Jones, Id. 355.
And it has been held that one who

is travelling upon the highway on Sunday in violation of the statute cannot
recover of the town for damages suffered
by reason of defects therein : Bosworth
v. Swansey, 10 Met. 363. And if the
plaintiff seeks to recover upon the
ground that his travelling was a work
of necessity or charity, and not of a.
secular character, so as to come within
the statute, the burden of proof is upon
him: Id.; Jones v. Andover, 10 Allen
18. Chief Justice SH.tw, in Bosworth
v. Swansey, treats the question, as being
whether the illegal act contributed to the
injury. Upon this view the decision of
the principal case would be free from
all difficulty, provided the questioti,
how far the violation of the city ordinance contributed to the injury, is properly one for the jury. In the case of
travelling on Sunday in violation of
the statute, it clearly could not be regarded as a proper question to be submitted to the jury, whether the illegal
act contributed to the injury. That
must be regarded as one of those selfevident propositions to be ruled by the
court. In New Hampshire it seems to
have been doubted how far the fact
that the plaintiff was travelling in violation of the statute will preclude a
recovery in such cases: Corry v. Bath,
35 N. H. 533. And in Norrisv. Litchfield, 35 N. H. 271, BELL, J., is reported
to have said, "as a general principle it
is wholly immaterial whether the plaintiff was acting in violation of law,
unless his wrongdoing has directly contributed to his damage." These dicta
seem to justify the decision in the principal case. And there are many cases
where the plaintiff's illegal act must be
considered as having contributed to his
injury, where he is not precluded from
recovery on that account. As where
one is injured by spring-guns set by the
owner upon his premises for the protection of his property, while the plaintiff
is trespassing thereon : Bird v. Hol-
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brook, 4 Bing. 628 ; s. c. 15 E. C. L.
R. 91. There is no end to the cases
bearing more or less directly upon the
question decided in the principal case.
The only question, which it seems to us
could fairly arise is the case, is how far
it is competent for the plaintiff to use
the highways of a town or city differently from the way the law allows him to
use them at all, and then claim damages
because they are not in complete repair,
and ask to have the jury decide, by
way of inference mdrely, since, from
the nature of the case, there could be
no direct evidence to the point, whether
his acknowledged abuse of his legal
li cense to use the highway in a particular manner, had any tendency, or contribdted, in any degree, to produce or
increase the injury. It requires no gift
of prophecy to foretell how such questions are likely to be decided by the
jury. The present case well illustrates
that point. The jury were ready to

say that the rate of speed had no connection with the injury ; but they could
not agree what the rate of speed was,
whether more or less than the law required. And as the case now stands
upon the record, the plaintiff was using
the highway in an illegal manner; but
not so as to contribute to his injury, in
the opinion of the jury. The only
doubt, as we have said, would seem to
be, whether the jury, by a mere inference, can purge the plaintiff from the
ordinary consequences of his illegal act,
that is to increase .the peril of travelling
as the speed increases, or whether the
defendant is fairly entitled to have the
benefit of this natural presumption, as
one of the presumptions which-the law
denominates presunptiones juris et de
jure. The case is somewhat novel, and
is presented by the learned judge with
great fairness and ability, as it seems to
US.
L F. R.

Supreme Court of -Errorsof Connecticut.
LEWIS M. WELCH v. CALVIN DURAND.
Smart-money may be allowed as damages in actions of tort founded on the
malicious or wanton misconduct or culpable negligence of the defendant.
The expenses of litigation may be taken into consideration in assessing the
damages in any case where smart-money may be allowed.
Where the defendant fired a pistol, the ball of which glanced and hit the plaintiff, and it was found that the injury was unintentional but was the result of gross
and culpablp carelessness on the part of the defendant, it was held- 1. That
trespass vi et armis would lie. 2. That the expenses of the litigation might be
considered in awarding damages to the plaintiff.
TRESPASS for an assault and wounding with a pistol ball;
brought to the Superior Court in New Haven county and heard
in damages, on a default, before MINOR, J.
On the hearing the court found that the plaintiff was injured
by a bullet from a pistol fired by the defendant, as alleged in the
declaration ; that the injury was unintentional, but was the result
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of gross and culpable carelessness and negligence on the part of
the defendant; and that the range of the pistol from which the
bullet was fired was not in the direction of the plaintiff, and that
the bullet after leaving the pistol struck some object before
wounding the plaintiff. And the court assessed the damages at
$350, of which $200 was for the injury to the plaintiff, and $150
for expenses of litigation, fees of counsel, &c., and rendered
judgment accordingly, whereupon the defendant moved for a new
trial.
JlMatrous, in support of the motion.

Doolittle and H. Stoddard, contri.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BUTLER, J.-The first error assigned in this case, is that the
court was not justified in assessing against the defendant, in
addition to the actual damage, a sum to cover the expenses of
litigation. It is not denied that we have a rule in this state
authorizing such assessment in a class of cases, but the claim is
that this case is not within the class,-for that to justify such damages wantonness or malice must be shown. It is not claimed
that the act was intentional or malicious, and it is denied that it
was wanton. Although used in our reports in reference to that
class of cases, "wantonness" is not alone an apt word to describe
one of the distinguishing elements of them. It is not found in
the older authorities, and does not appear in Tomlin's Law Dictionary. Bouvier has it, but as applicable to criminal law; and
defines it thus: "Crim. Law: A licentious act of one man toward
another without regard to his rights; as for example, if a man
should attempt to pull off another's hat against his will, in order
to expose him to ridicule, the offence would be an assault, and
if he touched him it would amount to a battery (q. v.) In such
case there would be no malice, but the wantonness of the act
would render the offending party liable to punishment." Licen.
tiousness is defined by him to be "the doing what one pleases
without regard to the rights of others." According to these
definitions wantonness is active,-action without regard to the
rights of others. But in Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225, the
term was applied to an omission to act. In that case the owner of
a cart which had been taken from its place and upset in the high.
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way by.wrong-doers, left it there, and the plaintiff was injured by
running against it. So in Beecher v. Derby Bridge Co., 24 Conn.
49-1,. the term is used to characterize an omission to repair a hole
in a bridge. The plaintiff's horse stepped into the hole and was
injured. Although thus used by eminent judges, the use of the
term alone, as applicable to cases of mere omission, would seem
to be of doubtful propriety, and such cases are included in the
class. Nor is it easy to find a single term which will correctly
and fully describe that portion of the cases in which malice is
not imputable, and we must look at the gist of the matter.
In St. Peter's Church v. Beach, 26 Conn. 855, it was holden
that the expenses of litigation were not a part of the damages,
and could only be taken into consideration where a penal sum or
smart-money might be given. In what cases then may smartmoney be awarded in addition to the damages? The proper
answer to this question, deducible from that and other cases in
our reports, seems to be, in actions of tort founded on the malicious or wanton misconduct or culpable neglect of the defendant.
Such then is the rule by which we are to be governed.
In this case the defendant was guilty of wanton misconduct
and culpable neglect. The latter is expressly found by the court
and would justify the judgment, but the former is shown by the
facts. The injury was a battery within the strictest definition.
It resulted to the person of the plaintiff from a ball put in motion
by the agency of the defendant without due care. It is an
immaterial fact that the injury was unintentional, and that the
ball glanced from the intended direction. Shooting at a mark is
lawful, but not necessary, and may be dangerous, and the law
requires extraordinary care to prevent injury to others; and if
the act is done where there are objects from which the balls may
glance and endanger others, the act is wanton, reckless, without
due care, and grossly negligent. The court did not err in allowing
the expenses of litigation to the plaintiff.
The defendant further claims that trespass was not the proper
action for the injury, and therefore that evidence should not have
been received to prove the extent of the injury and damages.
We think the action was properly brought. The injury was a
battery, within the definition of battery as cited from Bouvier.
It was effected by a substance put in motion by the defendant
with a want of due care. It was the direct and immediate result
of that motion recklessly given to the bullet by the defendant.
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Just such a case was decided in the 21st of Henry VII., which
is cited approvingly in the case of Bullock v. Babcock, 3
Wend. 391, in these words: "Where in shooting at butts the
archer's arrow glanced and struck another, it was holden to be a
trespass." (Year Book, 21 H. VII., 28 a.) Other similar cases
are there cited. That case of Bullock v. Babcock was an action
of trespass where an arrow was discharged at a basket and accidentally hit the plaintiff. The injury was unintentional, but the
shooting, at the time and place, was grossly negligent and careless.
The current of modern authority has set strongly in the same
direction. This subject was fully considered and many of the
cases cited in Morri8 v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75. In order to constitute the act of trespass, it is not necessary that it should be
intentional. It is sufficient if it is the direct and immediate consequence of a force exerted by the defendant without the exercise
of due care.
For these reasons a new trial is not advised.
We had occasion to consider the question of exemplary damages in civil
actions to some extent in a brief note:
10 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 33. There
are some terms used in regard to damages being awarded beyond the actual
pecuniary injury, in personal actions,
which seem to have tended to bring the
whole matter into discredit. Where
the exemplary damages have been
characterized as "vindictive damages,"
or as in the principal case, as "smart
money," ' it has the tendency to keep up
the impression in the popular, and to
some extent in the professional mind,
that some portion of the damages
awarded mist be put down to the score
of punishment of the defendant. It is
true, indeed, that the term "exemplary damages" may suggest the same
idea in some sense, but not in so objectionable a form, we think, as the
other terms alluded to. We should,
therefore, prefer to use that term or
else the expression, as it is very justly
denominated in another portion of the
opinion in the principal case, "a sum
to cover the expenses of litigation."

This latter is precisely what the law
ought tq allow, and what, in our
opinion it will, and does allow. We
know that the inclusion of counsel fees
eo nonine among the damages has been
objected to, and denied to be admissible, in some cases of good authority:
SHAW, Chief Justice, in Barnord v.
Poor, 21 Pick. 378, 381, 382, and
cases cited; Lincoln v. Saratoga 4Schenectady Railway, 23 Wend. 425,
435. But such a claim as part of the
damages is clearly countenanced in
Sandback v. Thomas, 1 Stark. 306,
although denied in others: Grace v.
Morgan, 2 Bing. N. C. 534; Jenkins v.
Biddulph, 4 Bing. 160; Sinclair v.
Eldred, 4 Taunt. 7. See also Webber
v. Nicholas, 1 R. &M. 419.
The case of Sandback v. Thomas,
supra, was for maliciously holding the
plaintiff to bail, and the court held him
entitled to recover "not merely the
taxed costs, but the costs as between
attorney and client." Lord ELLENBOrOUGH said: "Yon must indemnify
him against such expenses." And in
Webber v. Nicholas, supra, BEST, Chief
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Justice, said: "I should myself have
thought that my Lord ELsEnBOROUGH'8,
opinion was the correct one ;" but the
learned judge felt bound by the earlier
decision of his own court in bane, in
Sinclair v. Eldred, supra. And in
. Grace v. Morgan, supra, there is an
intimation by TiNDAL, Chief Justice, to
the same effect, referring to Jenkins v.
Biddalph, supra, as having concluded
the question. " But the latter case was
one for false return against an officer,
where exemplary damages are not allowed, as a general rule. And the
ease of Jenkins v. Biddulph was really
decided upon the authority of Sinclair
v. Eldred, supra, and Hathaway v.
Barrow, I Camp. 151, and not upon
what the court, at the time, regarded as
the true rule upon the point. But in
looking into the cases here relied upon
it will appear that Hathaway v. Barrow
turned upon the construction of an
order 11to pay costs," which the court
very justly held to mean taxable costs,
and was not, of course, in conflict with
the later opinion of the same judge in
Sandbacc v. Thomas, already adverted
to. And the case of Sinclairv. Eldred,
upon which all the other English cases
against the allowance of counsel fees,
as part of the necessary expenses of
litigation, seem to rest, was not an action in which the plaintiff recovered at
all. There was, therefore, no occasion
to discuss the question of damages, in
the court in bane, where a rule to enter
a nonsuit in the action was made absolute, on the ground that the fact that
the plaintiff in the former action by
arrest of the body had bceome nonsuit,
was no evidence that the same was instituted maliciously. It is true the
plaintiff at Nisi Prius had claimed
that the plaintiff becoming non-suit in
the action, after swearing out a capias,
was not only evidence of malice in
instituting the proceedings, but that
he should also recover the expense of

the proceedings, as between attorney
aud client. And the learned Chief
Justice MANSFn tD, in giving judgment
against the plaintiffs right to maintain
the action at all, upon the facts proved,
also volunteered to tell him, that he
could not recover the costs, as between
attorney and client, even if he had
proved express malice in instituting the
proceedings. As this was a mere
obiter dictum of the judge, in rounding
out his judgment upon another point;
it seems a little remarkable that it
should have been treated as authority
by the courts to so great an extent in
England, while all along protesting
against its soundness or justice. But
the foregoing summary of the cases
will show that the weight of judicial
opinion, in England even, is greatly in
fayor of embracing the expenses of the
litigation in the indemnifying suit.
For when one is subjected to litigation by the wrongful act of another, his
suit for redress is but a suit for indemnity against the loss and expense of the
litigation, to which he has thus wrongfully been subjected. And in all suits
for indemnity against other suits the
party entitled to indemnity is allowed
to recover the expenses of the first suit,
as between attorney and client, unless
it appear that he should have paid the
money without waiting for an action to
be brought. Thus, where one, to whom
property is warranted, either as to its
title or quality, is compelled to respond
in damages to his vendee to whom he
gave a similar warranty, atd is by consequence compelled to resort to an
action for his indemnity, he will be
allowed to recover, not only the damages and taxable costs recovered of him,
but, in addition thereto, the whole expenses of the litigation. But none of
these cases exactly touch the point of
counsel fees and other expenses of the
very suit brought to recover the very
damages which the party himself sus-
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tains, by the wrongful act of another.
There seems to be a kind of incongruity
in allowing the party to recover, by
way of damages, the counsel fees incurred i the very prosecution then
pending, anl which, by a settled rule
of practice, the party prevailing in the
suit is not allowed to recover, by way
of costs. It seems to be a sort of evasion of the rule of the court disallowing
the expenses as part of the costs. And
we think there has always been some
hesitation, among judges holding trial
terms, in allowing counsel fees to come
in, as part of the damages, in any
class of actions,
But we confess an inability to comprehend why such expenses should not
be embraced in all verdicts, which are
intended to affird the injured party full
indemnity. It is certain he cannot, or
will not, obtain full indemnity short of
that. In actions where there is no culpable negligence, or intentional wrong,
it may be fair enough, in estimating
the actual damage done or suffered, to
restrict the jury to the actual pecuniary
loss suffered by the act or omission at
the time it occurs. But this, it will be
perceived, in some measure, will have
the effect to divide the more important
expenses of the litigation between the
parties. And this may be just enough
in the majority of cases. No one expeets full indemnity against all those
inflictions which constantly arise from
living in a social state. All that can
be hoped for is such an approximation,
as will so quicken the sluggish and
restrain the greedy, as to keep them
within endurable limits,
But in all that considerably numerous
class of actions, where the jury are
allowed to look beyond the actual damage and injury at the the moment of its
infliction, and to have regard to affording the plaintiff full indemnity for all
losses incidental as well as direct; in
short, in all actions where the fault is
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exclusively on one side, and upon that
side more or less wanton, or grossly
negligent, it seems highly suitable,
that some regard should be had to those
expenses of litigation, which are never
allowed to be embraced in the taxed
bill of costs. The difference between
the actual costs of litigation and those
which the prevailing party will be'
allowed to embrace in his taxed bill is,
day by day, in this country, growing
wider and wider. Partly from the fact,
perhaps, that the profession in an early
day obtained a fee-bill in their favor of
somewhat liberal character, and more
from the prejudice which exists in the
popular mind, against what has been
called their cupidity, growing mainly,
we believe, out of the disposition to
judge the mass, by extreme cases of
abuse in that direction ; the fee-bill of
taxable costs was fixed by subsequent
legislation at the extreme point, almost,
of starvation, and has been studiously
maintained at that low point almost of
zero, while the expenses of almost
everything else, in the meantime, has
risen from two, to tenfold. Under
such extreme limitations in the taxable
costs it became indispensable to allow
large charges, as between attorney and
client, not embraced in the fee-bill of
taxable costs. And if the jury can
have no regard to those expenses, in
estimating damages in cases of mere
wanton outrages, it will follow that the
mere expenses of litigation will drive
the injured party out of court, since his
recovery of the mere pecuniary loss, at
the moment of the infliction of the
injury, will not meet the necessary exWe confess,
penses of litigation.
therefore, to a decided preference of
the rule laid down in the principal case,
above that which shuts out all incidental
considerations in estimating the damages in wanton and malicious injuries.
We cannot regard an action in that
class of cases as differing, in principle,
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from a suit for indemnity. And if in
suite stritly for indemnity against loss,
caused by br4ach of covenant or of
warranty, counsel fees and other expenses of litigation not embraced in

the taxable costs may be embraced; it
seems to us they should be in actions
for compensation for malicious injuries.
I. F. R.

Spreme Court of -Error8of Connecticut.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK v. NEW MILFORD.
C., who was at the same time treasurer of a town and cashier of a bank, took
$3000 from the funds of the bank for his own use and executed a note to the bank
for the amount as treasurer of the town, the note being entered upon the books of
the bank in the same manner with other notes taken for money loaned. C. was
the principal financial manager of the bank, and had been allowed and accustomed
to make loans at his discretion without consulting the directors. He had already,
without their knowledge, embezzled the funds of the bank to a large amount. The
town had been in the habit of borrowing money at this bank and elsewhere, and
upon notes executed by the town treasurer, and these loans had been reported to
the town in the annual reports of the treasurers, which reports had been accepted
by the town. Occasional votes of the town for thirty years had authorized the
treasurers to borrow money for the use of the town, generally for some particular
purpose; but except in one instance the treasurers had acted under the direction of the selectmen of the town. In a suit by the bank against the town upon
the note, it was held:1. That the votes of the town and the reports of the town treasurers were admissible in evidence upon the question of the authority of C. to borrow money for the
town.
2. (By a majority of the court.) That as C. was engaged in an extensive fraud
upon the bank, and in view of all the facts, it was fairly presumable that he made
the note in the form in which he did as a false representation and cover by which
to perpetrate a fraud on the bank, and with no intention to bind the town.
3. But that, if he intended to bind the town, his own fraud as treasurer was
known to him as agent of the bank, and was therefore the knowledge of the bank,
and that the plaintiffs therefore could not recover.

ASSUMPSIT on a note of $3000, dated December 28th 1866,
executed by "J. J. Conklin, treasurer of the town of New
Milford," payable to the plaintiffs or their order on demand, and
held by them; tried in the Superior Court on the general issue
closed to the court. The following facts were found by the
court:At the time the note was executed Conklin was treasurer of

the town of New Milford, and had been such from the year 1860
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with the exception of one year, and continued to be so until
September 1867, and was also the cashier of the bank of the
plaintiffs from the year 1858 down to September 1867. He
executed the note ,on the day of its date, and then drew the
money on it from the bank, but appropriated the money to his
own use and not to the use of the town, and the town had no
benefit from it. The money was used by him in private speculations in New York. He also used funds of the bank about that
time in his own private speculations to the amount of about
$50,000, and eventually lost the same. The misappropriation
of these moneys first became known to the bank, the town, and
the public in September 1867.
None of the selectmen or other officers of the town had any
knowledge of the existence of the note in suit until September
1867, when the defalcations became public. At the date of the
note there was on hand in the treasury of the town about $1386,
and the town was not then in want of money. The note was
regularly entered in the books of the bank by Conklin, and was
filed by the clerk and placed among the papers of the bank of a
similar kind. It was, and long had been, the practice of the
cashier to discount paper and to cash notes without consulting the
directors, and he was, and long had been, the principal financial
officer of the bank.
The annual reports of the treasurers of the town from the year
1859 to the year 1866 inclusive, showing numerous cases of
money borrowed by the treasurers, which reports were accepted
by the town, were read in evidence by the plaintiffs, the defendants excepting to the same. Some of these loans had been obtained at the plaintiff's bank. Numerous votes of the town with
regard to borrowing money for the use of the town were also put
in evidence by the plaintiffs, extending back for thirty years before
the year 1866, in many of which the town treasurer was authorized
to borrow money for the wants of the town, the amount generally
being limited, and in most cases the object for which the money
was to be borrowed being stated. In connection with these
reports and votes the plaintiffs proved that whenever money was
borrowed by the town the uniform practice had been for the
treasurer to make notes therefor, which were usually in form
substantially like the one in suit, and that all these notes, except
the one in suit, had been paid by the town; but it appeared that
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in every case but one the treasurer acted by the direction and
under the advice of the selectmen, the direction being oral and
the selectmen not usually communicating in person with the
lender. There was no proof that the selectmen had directed the
treasurers to borrow money when there was money in the treasury
sufficient to meet present wants, or when the money was not
needed for the use of the town.
Upon these facts the plaintiffs claimed that Conklin, as treasurer, had authority to bind the town by the note in suit, and
that the town had held their treasurers out to the world as so
authorized, and upon all the facts the plaintiffs claimed that they
were entitled to recover on the note.
The defendants objected to all the evidence offered by the
plaintiffs to prove the authority of Conklin to bind the town by
implication, or in any way except by express authority; and the
defendants claimed from the votes so offered in evidence by the
plaintiffs that Conklin had no authority to make and deliver the
note in question without the direction of the selectmen, and that
the note was, as to the defendants, without consideration, and

that Conklin committed a fraud in the execution of it, and that
the plaintiffs were bound by his acts, and had notice of his fraud
and of the want of consideration through Conklin as their cashier
and agent; and also had notice in the same way that the moneys
received by him as the avails of the note were for his own use
and not for the use of the defendants, and that he had no authority to bind the town to the payment of the note without the
direction of the selectmen. And the defendants for these reasons
claimed that they were not liable in the action, and that the note
was never executed by them.
The question whether the evidence objected to was admissible,
and the question what judgment should be rendered in the case,
were reserved for the advice of this court.
0. S. Seymour and -.

V. Seymour, for the plaintiffs.

Graves and McMahon, for the defendants.
BUTLER, J.-The facts in this case are very simple and the
law is equally so, and there is no aspect of them under which the
defendants can be subjected upon the note.
Conklin was treasurer of the town, and cashier and loan officer
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of the bank. It is immaterial whether or not he had authority,
as treasurer of the town, to draw the note and obtain the loan
without the advice and assent of the selectmen, if the money had
been needed by the town. And immaterial whether the evidence
offered and objected to was admissible or not. As the point is'
made, however, we decide that it was admissible.
Whether he had authority to make a loan or not is immaterial,
because it is found that the town was not in want of the money,
that the treasury was supplied, and that he intended the money
for his own use, and therefore, that if he intended to pledge the
credit of the town, the act was a gross fraud upon the town.
Did he then intend to pledge the credit of the town to the
bank ? A majority of the court think not. Conklin was then
engaged in an extensive embezzlement of the funds of the bank,
and liable to detection by its officers if they examined its accounts.
That fact, and the form of the note, and the presumption that he
would not unnecessarily commit another offence, and that he would
not contemplate going through the unnecessary form of contracting by himself, as treasurer of the town, with himself as fihancial
officer of the bank, under the circumstances in which he was
placed, indicate that he drew the note, entered it in the books,
and caused it to be filed by the clerk, as a false representation
and cover, precisely as he made other false representations and
false entries, intending to restore the money and take out the note,
and not intending to onerate the town. If that is so, there was no
meeting of minds and no purchase of the note or contract of loan
which will sustain this action.
Assuming, however, that there was a contract of loan, it was
made by Conklin as agent of the town with Conklin as agent of
the bank. If Conklin, as agent of the town, had applied to the
directors for a loan, offering the note and telling them that he had
drawn it, not for the benefit of the town, but for his own benefit,
without consulting the officers of the town, and when there was a
sufficient supply of money in the treasury, it must be conceded
that the board would in making the loan have been particep8
crimini in the fraud, and the bank could not recover in this
action. We cannot perceive that that case would differ from this.
The coritract, if any was made, was made by Conklin on behalf
of the bank. No other mind but his met the mind of the agent
of the town in making the contract. He as agent of the bank
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had fall knowledge therefore of the fraud; and now the bank, if
they ratify his contract and confirm his agency, must accept his
kuowledge and be bound by it, precisely as if the loan had been
made and the knowledge had by the board of directois.
We think it very clear, therefore, in whatever aspect the case
may be viewed, that the note in question is not a valid note
against the town in the hands of the plaintiffs, and judgment must
be advised for the defendants.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The principal question involved in the
foregoing case is one of great importance, and one which seems at different
times to have produced more or less
confusion in the minds of very learned
jurists and able judges. The question
stripped of all disguise. and evasion is
simply this: how far the principal and
his agent must be regarded as one in the
consummation of such acts as one may
bindingly do through the instrumentality
of'others. There are a certain class of
writers and experts in the law, who
seem to regard it as a very creditable
thing to devise some expedient whereby
one man may commit a very grievous
fraud and wrong upon another, through
the misrepresentations of an agent,
wholly impossible in regard to ability
himself to respond for the damages, and
at the same time take all the benefits and
repudiate all the responsibilities for the
wrongful acts whereby such benefits
were secured. Cori.foot v. Fowke, 6 M.
& W. 358, is an eminent instance of this
kind, which produced such flagrant injustice as to shock the sensibilities of
every right-minded man; but which has
been attempted to be sustained upon
numerous evasions and refinements,
during the life of its estimable author, the
late Lord CtANWORTH, and will probably now fall into its merited oblivion.
But since that decision the English courts
have discussed the question, how far the
knowledge of the agent of any purposed

fraud must affect the principal although
ignorant of such purpose, and it seems
now conceded, that the knowledge of the
agent is the knowledge of the principal,
without regard to the mode of its acquisition or the fact of its being communicated to the principal : Dresser v. Norwood, 14 C. B. N. S. 574; s. c. in Exchequer Chamber, 10 Jur. N. S. 851,
17 C. B. N. S. 466. The same rule is
maintained in Hart v. The Bank, 33 Vt.
252.
But the principle of the decision in
Cornfoot v. Fowke, supra, is, if possible,
still more shocking to the sense of justice than that of those just alluded to,
where the principal is wholly innocent
of all guilty knowledge, and is made
responsible for that of his agent acquired
in a different transaction, and not communicated to the principal. In Cornfoot
v. Fowke the principal knew himself of
a defect in the dwelling, which rendered
it uninhabitable by decent people, being
next door to a brothel of the worst kind,
and still withheld this knowledge from
his agent with a view to enable him innocently to obtain a tenant. Well might
Lord St. LEOXARDS say, as he did, in
Nat. Exch. Co. v. Drew, 2 Macqueen
(H. of L.) 103, "I should be very
much shocked at the law of England,
if I could bring myself to believe it
would not reach the case of a person sb
availing himself of a misrepresentation
of his own agent." One would almost
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suppose there must be something peculiar in the organization or habits of a
human being who could come to any
other conclusion. The English courts,
in a late case, Proudfoot v. Mfonteflore,
Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 511, have held that
where an agent, the master of a ship,

withholds knowledge of its loss from the
owner, that he may be in condition to
effect insurance which he does, the policy
is void, overruling the case of Ruggles
v. Insurance Co., 4 Mason 75, S. c. 12
Wheat. 408.
I. F. R.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
PETER BLYNN v. THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY.
A statute which directs that notice of a special criminal term "shall be posted
up at the court-house door ten days before its commencement" is directory only,
and a person convicted at such term, notice of which was posted only eight days,
is not, for that reason, entitled to a new trial.
Drunkenness may, under peculiar circumstances repelling malice, reduce the
grade of the crime of homicide from murder to manslaughter.
THE appellant was indicted, tried and convicted of murder, at
a special session of the Boone Circuit Court. The term of the
court was ordered in vacation, only a few days after the homicide,
and commenced on the eighth day after the order was made.
The other facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

J hn L. Scott, for appellant.
John .Rodman, Attorney-General, for the Commonwealth.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROBERTSON, J.-The defendant's appeal to this court, urging
various objections to the judgment, asserts, in limine, that the
special term, held without the notice prescribed by law, was illegal, and that for want of jurisdiction the verdict and judgment
against him are void.
If, as assumed, the sentence was not a judicial act, this court
cannot judicially revise and reverse it, and the appellant's only
lawful appeal would be to another department of the government,
not fettered as this court is, by inexorable law. But in our judgment the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to order the grand jury
and special juries to try the appellant on the indictment found
by that grand jury, and to sentence him to be hung on the verdict of "guilty" by that chosen venire. The following quotation
VOL.

XIX.-37
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from section 1, subsection 2, of article 12, chapter 27, Revised
Statutes, page 821, presents all that is here material of the statutory law regulating special terms of the Circuit Courts.
Section 1. "1When the business requires it, a circuit judge
may hold a special term in any county in his district for the trial
of chancery, penal and criminal causes, or either."
Section 2. "If the order be made in vacation for a special term,
notice thereof shall be posted up at the court-house door ten days
before its commencement."
The constructive object of the prescribed notice decides the
question of jurisdiction. Did the legislature intend that ten
days' notice should be indispensable to the jurisdiction; or, in
other words, a fundamental condition of the validity of the proceedings of the called terms, or did it intend only that the requisition of the notice should be merely directory or precautionary ?
If the former be adjudged to be the legislative purpose, its comprehensive effects would be to make void not only all criminal
convictions and preparatory orders and proceedings, but all preparation orders and decrees in chancery. This would be vexatious and perilous, without adequate motive, and far beyond the
prudent policy or presumable aim of legislative wisdom. The
contemplated publication, if accepted as required, might be immediately destroyed, or if not torn down, might give no actual
notice to any person interested. And can it be reasonably presumed that the legislature intended that the jurisdiction of the
court should depend on so slight and trivial a circumstance as
putting on the court-house door a paper subject to so many accidents, and at best so uncertain and fallible as a notice to all
concerned? Moreover, if the order be made at a regular term,
no such notice is required, but the special term may be held,
without question, the next day after the order for it had been
entered on the record-book of the court. And even if that order
should not be recorded before the commencement of the special
term, would the omission vacate the term? Wg cannot so think,
and unless it would, the question in this case is concluded.
The fact that no extrinsic notice is required when the order
was made in court, shows that when made out of court, the
posting it on the court-house door is required, not to give jurisdiction, but only to guard in that way against surprise by what
may be publication of the order. Had it been put up as reqiuired
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the appellant could not have been benefited by'it, otherwise than
by affording him time to escape. He could not have introduced
evidence before the grand jury, and the non-publication, at the
utmost, could have operated on him as a surprise, which might
have entitled him to some postponement of the trial.
The law organizing circuit courts, and fixing the terms during
which they shall sit, if necessary, may not deny their inherent
power to prolong any of those terms, or order special terms without express statutory authority; and the statutes on that subject
may have been intended not so much for giving that power as
for directing the mode of exercising it. On this hypothesis,
wvhich we consider maintainable, such directory statute gives the
jurisdiction, and nonconformity to the prescribed direction cannot
divest it as pre-existing.
But if mistaken in this, we still think that the statute we are
now considering is only directory. The judge who ordered the
special term was still judge of the same court when he presided
over the trial at the special term. He had pre-existing jurisdiction over such homicide committed in Boone. Consent could not
give it, nor opposition divest it. The said subsection 2 also provides
that parties may agree to a special term. But unless the court
would have jurisdiction without their authority or acquiescence,
their consent could not give it, and the only object or effect of
their consent would be to preclude any pretence of surprise at
the holding of the special term. And this clearly indicates that
the legislature required the notice, not to legalize the special
term or give the judge jurisdiction, but solely to prevent surprise. And this is as manifest as if the act, after allowing a
special term, had said: "1But for the convenience of parties concerned and to prevent surprise, the order, if made in court, shall
without other notice be entered on the record, so that the bar
may know it, or if made in vacation, shall be posted up at the
court-house door for ten days." Could there then be any doubt
that it would be the order and not the quasi notice of it that
would give the court jurisdiction ? And this is the constructive
aim of the act, as clearly as if it had been explicitly so declared.
The act contains nothing implying that the prescribed publication
is the condition on which the special term may be held, or that it
shall be a legal nullity without such publication. But the contrary is implied by the context, object, and character of the
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enactment. As to the jurisdiction, therefore, the circuit judge
had all the judicial power which he could have exercised over
this case at a regular term of his court. In this conclusion Judge
HARrw does not concur.
Then we must revise the case within the scope of our circumscribed jurisdiction over judgments in criminal proceedings.
The only contestable question in the record, within the range
of our appellate power, is involved in the instructions, and that
is confined to the hypothesis assumed on the testimony, that when
the homicide was perpetrated the appellant was drunk, which fact,
according to the case of Smith v. Commonwealth, 1 Duvall 224,
to wrhich we adhere, may, under peculiar circumstances repelling
malice, reduce the grade of the crime from murder to manslaughter. But the mitigating tendency of intoxication is not
allowable when that condition of mind has been produced for the
purpose of stimulating a meditated felony, or even when it is
known to excite homicidal or other destructive passions; because
such an inebriate hostis humani generi8 evinces express malice.
But when in the absence of any such aggravating circumstances,
a. responsible being, drunk from accident or mere sensuality,
takes human life without rational motive, and which he never
would have attempted, but always would have revolted at when
sober and self-possessed, the principle of the decision in Smith v.
Commonwealth allows the jury to consider the abnormal condition: of the mind and passions so superinduced, as a circumstance
which, while it should not excuse, may tend to repel the implication of malice essential to the crime of murder.
In this case it appears that the appellant, on the day of the
homicide, had gone to Burlington, and there drinking much
liquqr, and trying to buy the tincture of cantharides, he acted
and talked strangely, and returning homeward cut the boy's
throat without any imaginable motive, unless he killed him to
conceal a meditated crime on another. But there is now no
sufficient clew in the evidence to allow the imputation of such a
horrible motive. Proof that he was drunk was pertinent in this
state of the case as a circumstance helping to account for an act
otherwise inexplicable, and the jury had a right to weigh that
fact and give it its proper effect on .the question of malice.
If the jury on all the facts had believed that when he killed
the boy the appellant had no actual malice, and also that with-
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out knowing, or having from experience cause to apprehend that
what he drank that day might instantly produce transient delusion, or so influence the passions or unhinge the mind as to
jeopard human life, which would have been in no danger from
his hand had he been perfectly sober and self-poised, and also
that he drank the intoxicating liquor merely for sensual gratification or exhilaration, and not for stimulating some meditated
crime, then they might and perhaps ought to have believed that
there was no implied malice, and that therefore the appellant
was not guilty of murder for which he should be hung, but of
manslaughter only for which he should be sent to the penitentiary.
This we consider both sound philosophy and good law, and
when prudently applied, it illustrates the general principle recognised in Smith v. The Commonwealth.
On the trial several witnesses testified that when much excited
by liquor, the appellant became partially delirious, gave way to
violent passions and insane illusions after imagining that "somebody was after him," and twice attempted suicide. On the foregoing facts, combined with strong proof of the homicide by the
appellant, the Circuit Court, by its instructions accurately defined exculpatory insanity, without any definition of manslaughter, or any other allusion to the appellant's mental condition than that implied by the instruction on insanity as an
epeuse for homicide, and which was more favorable in one aspect
than the appellant was entitled to expect on the facts and the
law; for transient insanity, produced by his voluntary act, would
not, as the instruction implied, excuse, but at the utmost only
extenuate the homicide from murder to manslaughter. Proof of
his being drunk could be available to him only for such extenuation, whether his intoxication caused temporary delirium or not.
Without resulting in technical insanity, it might, however, have
been such as to reduce the grade of a crime so unaccountable by
helping to repel implied malice.
What he needed most, therefore, was a specific and full instruction on the subject of mitigation and not of excuse. But
the instructions as given excluded from the jury any consideration of that subject, and consequently the court's pretermission
of it was misleading, and the verdict as rendered was the inevitable consequence unless he was insane.
According to the criminal code, the presiding judge should,
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when asked for instructions, give the whole law applicable to all
the facts; and this was peculiarly proper in a case so sudden and
hurried, and especially as the court, having appointed counsel to
defend, should have presented, sua Vonte, all the law to the jury
to which appellant was entitled. But though the argument in
this court has not discussed the mitigating principle, nevertheless
the appointed counsel offered at the trial the following instruction :"The jury are instructed that if they believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prisoner did the killing
charged, yet, if they believe that he was drunk at the time, they
may mitigate the offence from murder to manslaughter."
That proposition might have been misunderstood or misapplied
without some qualification as to the degree of drunkenness, and
also as to the countervailing hypothesis of getting drunk to stimulate crime, or of the appellant's knowledge of the probability that
destructive passion would be the consequence. But the court
rejected it without giving any modification or other instruction
on the subject. In this there was an inadvertent omission which
may have been prejudicial to the appellant.
When intoxicating liquor inflames and perverts the passions and
blinds the reason, as it often does, a good man may, without provocation, be unconsciously precipitated into a crime which he had
never meditated, and which he never could have attempted when
perfectly sober and self-possessed. To hang him would be a cruel
penalty for being drunk-to excuse him would encourage vice
and disturb social order and security. He should be punished, but
not as the secret assassin or highway murderer. The crime in
this case, by whomsoever perpetrated, was signally monstrous and
mysterious. The perpetrator may have been unconscious of the
act or of its guilt, or it may have been prompted by momentary
illusion, or blind passion beyond control. Why else was the
brutal act done? And if so done, the gallows is not, but imprisonment is, the legal retribution. Therefore we think the Circuit
Court ought to have defined express malice and defined and discriminated between murder and manslaughter, and then instructed
the jury in substance and effect that if the accused cut the boy's
throat, his being drunk at the time is no legal excuse; nor even
mitigating circumstance, if that condition, however stultifying,
was the offspring of meditated crime, or was known to be the
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parent of passions or delusions dangerous to the lives of other
persons, and also that, if not so intended or so known, then, if
the jury should believe that it was the cause of the homicide,
which otherwise would not have been perpetrated, they might
consider it with all the other facts conducing to show the existence or the non-existence of malice for fixing the grade of the
crime, and that if they should then rationally doubt the imputed
malice, they should convict of manslaughter, and fix the period
of confinement in the penitentiary. If thus substantially instructed, the verdict, whatever it may have been, would have been
more satisfactory to all concerned, and far more assuring that
justice had been fairly and fully done according to the law
of the land. Whatever he may be, or whatever shall or ought
to be his doom, it is the duty of the court, as the last judicial resort, to take care in defiance of all contingent consequences,
that he shall have a fair and deliberate trial according to the law.
The Commonwealth wants no more, her interest requires that
much, and our duty to her as well as to him demands it, Wherefore, the judgment of conviction is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
HARDIN, J., dissented, holding that the notice of the session
of the Circuit Court required by the statute not having been
given, the trial and sentence were not judicial acts, and not,
therefore, subject to revision in this court. He therefore declined to express any opinion upon the merits of the case.
It is now well settled law that fixed
insanity, which is the result and consequence of long-continued habits of intoxication, as well as delirium tremens,
caused by sudden abstinence from the
habitual use of intoxicating liquor, are
alike a complete defence for any act committed while in that condition: United
States v. Drew, 5 lason 28; United
State. v. McGlue, 1 Curtis C. C. I ; Te
People v. Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 562 ; Bailey
v. 27e State, 26 Ind. 422; Maconnehey
v. The State, 5 Ohio St. It. 77. But
the general current of authorities does
not extend the excuse of drunkenness so
far as tle principal case, and Snith's

Case, 1 Duvall 224, seem disposed to do;
for it is generally considered that mere
intoxication, however gross, ought not
to be held either an excuse for an unprovoked homicide, nor to reduce it from
murder to manslaughter. If a person,
while sane and responsible, voluntarily
makes himself intoxicated, and while in
that state, commits murder by reason of
insanity, which was one of the consequences of such intoxication, and one
of the attendants in that state, he is responsible; although there is no evidence
that he became intoxicated for the purpose of "stimulating him to the act."
See United States v. 3fcGlue, 1 Curtis

WBLYNN

v. COMMONWEALTH.

C. C. I ; Pirtlev. The State, 9 Humph.
663; Mls State v. John, 8 Ired. 330;
C6rrUslv. TheState, Mart. &Yerg. 147 ;
T State v. Turner, Wright 30; CornoawecaltA v. Hawkins, 3 Gray 463.
The true and safe effect to allow to
-drunkenness in cases of homicide seems
to be, that where the deceased gave the
defendant a provocation which would
have been ordinarily sufficient in law to
reduce the homicide to manslaughter,
but which a sober man might or might
not have acted upon, and been influenced
by, there the defendant may show his
intoxication, and the consequent excitement of his passions, as tending to show
that he did in fact act upon such provocation, when he might or would not have
done so in his sober moments. But the
law does not allow that acts or words
used by the person killed towards the
party killing him, shall be an excuse,
reducing his murder to manslaughter,
if the accused were drunk, when they
would not have that effect, if used towards a sober man. It does not have
two standards of sufficient legal provocation ; one for sober men, and one for
persons intoxicated. This distinction is
nowhere better stated than in an early
case in South Carolina: 7he State v.
MUcCants, I Speers 384, and this has
been more or less distinctly recognised
in other states. See Pirtlev. The State,
9 Humph. 570; Haile v. The State, I1
Id. 154; O'Brien v. The People, 48
Barb. 275 ; The People v. Rogers, 18
N. Y. 9. And the late case of The State
v. Cross, 27 Mo. 332, seems to go even
further. Mere intoxication, however
gross, will not, in and of itself, reduce
an act of homicide, !f wilfully committed,
from murder to manslaughter, simply on
the ground of want of premeditation, if
the act would, except for the intoxication, have been the higher offence. On
the other hand the fact of gross drunkenness may have some bearing upon the
question whether the fatal blow was in-

tentionally given, or was the result of
accident or carelessness, and not of design. The distinction, though not broad,
is real, and may tend to reconcile some
of the apparently conflicting dicta upon
this subject.
So a person who assaults another under a bond fide apprehension that his
own person or property is about to be
attacked, may show his intoxication as
one fact leading him the more easily to
apprehend such an attack, when he
might not otherwise do so: Marshall's
Case, 1 Lewin C.- C. 76; Regina v.
Gamlen, i F. & F. 90.
Still another legitimate effect may be
allowed to intoxication, viz. : when an
act requires some specific intent to exist,
and be found by a jury as an independent fact, in order to constitute a crime,
or the particular crime charged, the defendant may show his inability, by reason of intoxication, to form or entertain
such an intent: Regina v. Cruse, 8 C. &
P. 541, an indictment for an assault
with an intent to murder, in which a defendant was acquitted of the felonious
intent, although found guilty of the assault. See also Regina v. AlIonkhouse,
4 Cox C. C. 55 ; Rex v.,.Meakin, 7 C.
& P. 297; The Statev. Garey, 11 Minn.
154.
In like manner, where mental knowledge or consciousness is a material element in a crime, intoxication may be
such that such mental status did not exist, and therefore no offence would be
committed. A person indicted for passing counterfeit money, knowing its
worthlessness; for voting a second time at
an election, knowing that he had done so
before; for feloniously taking an article
which he knew did not belong to him,
may show such an oblivious mental
status as to incapacitate from committing the offence, although such condition
was produced by his own voluntary intoxication. See Pigman v. The State,
14 Ohio 555 ; The People v. Harris, 29
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Calif. 678 ; Bailey v. The State, 26 Ind.
422 ; The State v. Schingen, 20 Wise. 74.
Not that intoxication is ever an excuse
for crime, but only as a circumstance
tending to show that the particular crime
charged had never been committed , not
that the fact of intoxication ever, as a
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matter of law, positively disproves capacity to commit the act alleged, but only
that it is admissible for the consideration
of the jury. See State v. Arery, 44 N.
H. 392.
E. H. B.

Supreme Court of

llinois.

CHICAGO AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. THE
PEOPLE EX REL. HEMPSTEAD.
A railroad company, like any other common carrier, must serve all persons alike
so far as equally within its power. It is the duty of such company, therefore, to
deliver grain in bulk in the regular course of business to any elevator along its
line, as directed in the consignment. It is no excuse that the company has made
contracts with the owners of certain elevators to deliver exclusively to them.
But a railroad company cannot be made to deliver beyond its own line, even
though there is a connecting track between its terminus and the place of consignment, over which It has a right to run its cars on payment of certain track fees.

THIS was an application to the Superior Court of Chicago for a mandamus on the relation of the owners of the Illinois River Elevator, a grain
warehouse in the city of Chicago, to compel the railway company to deliver to said elevator grain in bulk consigned to it upon the line of its
road. There was a return duly made to the alternative writ, a demurrer to the return, and judgment pro forma upon the demurrer, directing the issuing of a peremptory writ. From that judgment the railway
company appealed to this court. The facts, as presented by the record,
were as follows:The company has freight and passenger depots on the west side of the
North branch of the Chicago river, north of Kinzie street, for the use
of the divisions known as the Wisconsin and Milwaukee divisions of the
road, running in a north-westerly direction. It also has depots on the
east side of the North branch, for the use of the Galena division, running west. It has also a depot on the South branch, near Sixteenth
street, which it reaches by a track diverging from the Galena line on
the west side of the city.
Under an ordinance of the city, passed August 10th 1858, the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago company, and the Chicago, St. Paul and
Fond du Lao company (now merged in the Chicago and North Western
company), constructed a track on West Water street, from Van Buren
street north to Kinzie street, for the purpose of forming a connection
between the two roads. The Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago company laid the track from Van Buren to Randolph street, and the Chicago and St. Paul and Fond du Lac company that portion of the track
from Randolph north to its own depot. The different portions of the
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track were, however, constructed by these two companies by an arrange.
meat between themselves, the precise character of which did not appear,
but it was to be inferred from the record that they had a common right
to the use of the track from Van Buren street to Kinzie, and did in fact
use it in common. The elevator of the relators is situated south of
Randolph street and north of Van Buren, and is connected with the
main track by a side track laid by the Pittsburgh company at the request
and expense of the owners of the elevator, and connected at each end
with the main track. The other facts appear in the opinion.
LAWRENCE, C. J.-Since the 10th of August 1866, the Chicago and
North Western company, in consequence of certain arrangements and
agreements on and before that day entered into between the company
and the owners of certain elevators known as the Galena, NorthWestern,
Munn & Scott, Union, City, Munger & Armour, and Wheeler, has refused to deliver grain in bulk to any elevator except those above named.
There is also in force a rule of the company adopted in 1864, forbidding
the carriage of grain in bulk if consigned to any particular elevator in
Chicago, thus reserving to itself the selection of the warehouse to which
the grain should be delivered. The rule also provides that grain in
bags shall be charged an additional price for transportation. This rule
is still in force.
The situation of these elevators to which alone the company will deliver grain is as follows: The North Western is situated near the depot
of the Wisconsin division of the road, north of Kinzie street; the Munn
& Scott, on West Water street, between the elevator of relators and
Kinzie street; the Union and City, near Sixteenth street, and approached only by the track diverging from the Galena division on the
west side of the city already mentioned, and the others are on the west
side of the North branch of the Chicago river. The Munn & Scott elevator can be reached only by the line laid on West Water street, under
the city ordinance already mentioned, and the elevator of relators is
reached in the same way, being about four and one-half blocks further
south. The line of the Galena division of the road crosses the line on
West Water street at nearly a right angle, and then recrosses the North
branch on a bridge. It appears by the return to the writ that a car
coming into Chicago on the Galena division, in order to reach the elevator of relators, would have to be taken by a drawbridge across the
river on a single track, over which the great mass of the business of the
Galena division is done, then backed across the river again upon what
is known as the Milwaukee division of respondent's road, thence taken
to the track on West Water street, and the cars when unloaded could
only be taken back to the Galena division by a similar but reversed
process, thus necessitating the passage of the drawbridge with only a
single line four times, and, as averred in the return, subjecting the company to great loss of time and pecuniary damage in the delay that would
be caused to- its regular trains and business on that division.
This seems so apparent that it cannot be fairly claimed the elevator
of relators is upon the line of the Galena division in any such sense as
to make it obligatory upon the company to deliver upon West Water
street freight coming over that division of the road. The doctrine of
the Vincent case in 49 Ills., was that a railway company must deliver
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grain to any elevator which it had allowed by a switch to be connected
with its own line. This rule has been reaffirmed in an opinion filed at
the present term in the case of The People ex rel. Itempstead v. The
Chicago and Allon RailroadCompany, but in the last case we have also
held that a railway company cannot be compelled to deliver beyond its
own line simply because there are connecting tracks over which it might
pass by paying track service, but which it has never made a part of its
own line by use.
So far as we can judge by this record and the maps showing the railway
lines and connections filed as a part thereof, the Wisconsin and Milwaukee divisions running north-west, and the Galena division running west,
though belonging to the same corporation and having a common name,
are for the purposes of transportation substantially different roads, constructed under different charters, and the track on West Water street
seems to have been laid for the convenience of the Wisconsin and Milwaukee divisions. It would be a harsh and unreasonable application of
the rule announced in the Vincent Case, and a great extension of the
rule beyond anything said in that case, if we were to hold that these
relators could compel the company to deliver at their elevator grain
which has been transported over.the Galena division, merely because the
delivery is physically possible, though causing great expense to the com-.
pany and a great derangement of its general business, and though the'
track on West Water street is not used by the company in connection
with the business of the Galena division. What we have said disposes
of the case so far as relates to the delivery of grain coming over the
Galena division of respondent's road. As to such grain, the mandamus
should not have been awarded.
When, however, we examine the record as to the connection between
the relator's elevator and the Wisconsin and Milwaukee divisions of respondent's road, we find a very different state of facts. The track on
West Water street is a direct continuation of the line of the Wisconsin
and Milwaukee divisions. Cars coming on this track from these divisions do not cross the river. The Munn & Scott elevator, to which the
respondents deliver grain, is, as already stated, upon a side track connected with this track. The respondent not only uses this track to deliver grain to the Munn & Scott elevator, but it also delivers lumber and
other freight upon this track, thus making it not only legally, but actually, by positive occupation, a part of its road. The respondent in its
return admits in explicit terms that it has an equal interest with the
Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroad in the track laid on West
Water street. It also admits its use, and the only allegation made in
the return fbr the purpose of showing any difficulty in delivering to relator's elevator the grain consigned thereto from the Wisconsin and Milwaukee divisions is, that those divisions connect with the line on West
Water street only by a single track, and that respondent cannot deliver
bulk grain or other freight to the elevator of relators even from those
divisions without large additional expense, caused by the loss of the use
of motive power, labor of servants, and loss of use of cars while the
same are being delivered and unloaded at said elevator and brought
back. As a reason for non-delivery on the grounds of difficulty, this is
simply frivolous. The expense caused by the loss of the use of motive
power, labor, and cars while they are being taken to their place of des-
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tination and unloaded, is precisely the expense for which the company
is paid its freight. It has constructed this line on West Water street
in order to do the very work which it now in general terms pronounces
a source of large additional expense, yet it does not find the alleged additional expense an obstacle in the way of delivering grain upon this
track at the warehouse of Munn & Scott, or delivering other freights to
other persons than the relators. Indeed, it seems evident from the diagrams attached to the record that three of the elevators to which the
respondent delivers grain are more difficult of access than that of the
relators, and three of the others have no appreciable advantage in that
respect, if not placed at a decided disadvantage by the fact that they
can be reached only by crossing the river.
We presume from the argument that the respondent's counsel place
no reliance upon this allegation of additional expense so far as the Wisconsin and Milwaukee divisions are concerned. They rest the defence
on the contracts made between the company and the elevators above
named for exclusive delivery to the latter to the extent of their capacity. This brings us to the most important question in the case. Is a
contract of -this character a valid excuse to the company for refusing to
deliver grain to an elevator upon its lines and not a party to the con.tract to which such grain has been consigned? In the oral argument
of their case, it was claimed, by counsel for the respondent, that a railway company was a mere private corporation, and that it was the right
and duty of its directors to conduct its business merely with reference
to the pecuniary interests of the steckholde rs. The printed arguments
do not go to this extent in terms, but they are colored throughout by
the same idea, and in one of them we
find counsel applying to the
Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court
of Pennsyldisparagement,
contemptuous
almosta common
and that"
of severe
carrier is in the exerhave said
those tribunals
because
vania language
cise of a sort of public office." (New Jersey Steam Navigation Coran v. Merckaots' .Bank, 6 1ow. 381; Sanford v. ailroad Go.,
24 Penn. 380.) If the language is not critically accurate, perhaps we can
pardon those courts when we find that substantially the same language
was used by Lord HorT in (ioggs v. Bernard, 2 Lord Raymond 909the leading case in all our books on the subject of bailments. The
language of that case is, that the common carrier "exercises a public
employment."
We shall engage in no discussion in regard to names. It is immatecan be properly said to be in the
rial whether or not these corporations
exercise of a "sort of public office," or whether they are to be styled
some
theyto owe
Certain
it is that
private
or guasi
ascertain
us now
concerns
public, and it only
to the corporations.
duties public
important
the extent of those duties, as regards the case made upon this record.
It is admitted by respondent's counsel that railway companies are
common carriers, though even *that admission is somewhat grudgingly
made. Regarded merely as a common carrier at common law, and independently of any obligations imposed by the acceptance of its charters,
it would owe important duties to the public, from which it could not
release itself, except with the consent of every person who might call
upon it to perform them. Among these duties, as well defi ed and
settled as -anything in the law, was the obligation to receive and carry
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goods for all persons alike, without injurious discrimination as to terms,
and to deliver them in afety totthe consignee, unless prevented by the
act of God or the public enemy. These obligations grew out of the relation voluntarily assumed by the carrier toward the public, and the requirements of public policy, and so' important have'they been deemed
that eminent judges have often expressed their regret that common car-'
riers have ever becn permitted to vary their common-law liability, even
by a special contract with the owner of the goods.
Regarded then mereiy as a common carrier at common law; the respondeit should not be permitted to say it will deliver goods at the
warehouse of A. and B , but will not deliver at the warehouse of C.,
the latter presenting equal facilities for the discharge of freight, and
being accessible on respondent's line.
But railway companies may well be regarded as under a higher obligation, if that were possible, than that imposed by the common law to
discharge their duties to the public as common carriers fairly and impartially. As has been said by other courts, the state has endowed
them with something of it6 own sovereignty in giving them the right of
eminent domain. By virtue of this power, they take the lands of the
citizen, against his will, and can, if need be, demolish his house. Is it
supposed these great powers were granted merely fdr the private gain
of the corporators?
On the contrary, we all know the companies were created for the
public good. The object of the legislature was to add to the means of
travel and commerce. If. then, a common carrier at common law came
under obligation to the public, from which he could not discharge himself at his own volition, still less should a railway company be permitted
to do so, when it was created fbr the public benefit and his received from
the public such extraordinary privileges. Railway charters not only give
a perpetual existence and great power, but they have been constantly
recognised by the courts of this country as contracts between the companies and the state imposingIreciprocal obligations.
The courts have always been, and we trust always will be, ready to protect these companies in their chartered rights, but on the other hand we
should be equally ready to insist that they perform faithfully t6 the
public those duties which were the object of their chartered powers.
We are not of course to be understood as saying or intimating that
the legislature or the courts may require from a railway company the
performance of any and all acts that might redound to the public benefit, without reference to the pecuniary welfare of the company itself.
We hold simply that it mdst perform all thosd duties' of a common carrier to which it knew it would be liable when it sought and obtained its
charter, and the fact that the public has bestowed upon it extraordinary powers is but an additional reason for holding it to a complete performance of its obligation.
The duty sought to be 'enforced in this proceeding is the delivery of
grain in bulk to the warehouse to which it is consigned, such wirehouse
Peing dn 't6ie libde of t hd respondents' road, 'with facilities fdr its delivery
eqiihl to those of other warehouses at which the'com'pa'fi' des deliver, and
the barriage of grain in bulk being a part of its regular business. This
then is the precise question decided in the Vincent Case in 49th Ill.,
and it is unnecessary to repeat what was then said. We may remark,
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however, that as the argument of counsel necessarily brought that
case under review, and as it was decided before the reorganization
of the court under the new constitution, the court as now constituted
has re-examined that decision, and fully concur therein. That case is
teally decisive of the present so far as respects grain transported on the
Wisconsin and Milwaukee divisions of respondents' road. The only
difference between this and the Vicent Case is in the existence of the
contract for exclusive delivery to the favored warehouses, and this contract can have no effect, when set up against a person not a party to it,
as an excuse for not performing toward such person those duties of a
common carrier prescribed by the common law and declared by the
statute of the state.
The contract in question is peculiarly objectionable in its character,
and peculiarly defiant of the obligations of the respondent to the public
as &common carrier. If the principle implied in it were conceded, the
railway companies of the state might make similar contracts with individuals at every important point upon their lines, and in regard to other
articles of commerce besides grain, and thus subject the business of the
state almost wholly to their control as a means of their own emolument.
Instead of making a contract with several elevators, as in the present
cae, each road that enters Chicago might contract with one alone, and
thus give to the owner of such elevator an absolute and complete monopoly in the handling of all the grain that might be transported on such
read. So, too, at every important town in the interior, each road might
ontract that all the lumber carried by it should be consigned to a particular yard. How injurious to the public would be the creation of such
a system of organized monopolies in the most important articles of commerce, claiming their existence under a perpetual charter from the state,
and by the sacredness of such charter claiming to set the legislative
will itself at defiance, it is hardly worth while to speculate. It would
be difficult to exaggerate the evil of which such a system would be the
cause, when fully developed and managed by unscrupulous hands.
Can it be seriously doubted whether a contract involving such a principle and such results is in conflict with the duties which the company
owes to the public as a common carrier? The fact that a contract has
been made is really of no moment, because, if the company can bind
the public by a contract of this sort, it can do the same thing by a mere
regulation of its own, and say to these relators that it will not deliver
at their warehouse the grain consigned to them, because it prefers to
deliver it elsewhere. The contract, if vicious in itself, so far from
excusing the road, only shows that the policy of delivering grain exclusively at its chosen warehouse is a deliberate policy, to be followed for
a term of years during which these contracts run.
It is, however, urged very strenuously by counsel for the respondent
that a common carrier, in the absence of contract, is bound to carry and
deliver only according to the custom and usage of his business; that it
depends upon himself to establish such custom and usage, and that the
respondent never having held itself out as a carrier of grain in bulk,
except upon condition that it may itself choose the consignee, this has
become the custom and usage of its business, and it cannot be required
to go beyond this limit. In answer to this position, the fact that the
respondent has derived its life and powers from the people, through the
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legislature, comes in with controlling force. Admit, if the respondent
were a private association which had established a line of wagons for the
purpose of carrying grain from the Wisconsin boundary to the elevator
of Munn & Scott, in Chicago, and had never offered to carry or deliver
it elsewhere, that it could not be compelled to depart from the custom
or usage of its trade, still the admission does not aid the respondent in
this case. In the case supposed, the carrier would establish the terminal points of his route at his own discretion, and could change them as
his interests might demand. He offers himself to the public as a common carrier to that extent, and he can abandon his first line and adopt
another at his own volition. If he should abandon it, and instead of
offering to carry grain only to the elevator of Munn & Scott, should
offer to carry it generally to Chicago, then he would clearly be obliged
to deliver it to any consignee in Chicago to whom it might be sent, and
to whom it could be delivered, the place of delivery being upon his line
of carriage.
In the case before us, admitting the position of counsel that a common carrier establishes his own line and terminal points, the question
arises, At what time and how does a railway company establish them?
We answer, when it accepts from the legislature the charter which gives
it life, and by virtue of such acceptance. That is the point of time at
which its obligations begin. It is then that it holds itself out to the
world as a common carrier whose business will begin as soon as the road
is constructed upon the line which the charter has fixed.
Suppose this respondent had asked from the legislature a charter
authorizing it to carry grain in bulk to be delivered only at the elevator
of Munn & Scott, and nowhere else in the city of Chicago. Can any one
suppose such a charter would have been granted? The supposition is preposterous. But instead of a charter making a particular elevator the
terminus and place of delivery, the legislator granted one which made
the city of Chicago itself the terminus, and, when this charter was
accepted, then at once arose on the part of the respondent the corresponding obligation to deliver grain at any point within the city of
Chicago upon its lines, with suitable accommodations for receiving it,
to which such grain might be consigned. Perhaps grain in bulk was
not then carried in cars, and elevators may not have been largely introduced. But the charter was granted to promote the conveniences of
commerce, and it is the constant duty of the respondent to adopt its
agencies to that end. When these elevators were erected in Chicago, to
which the respondent's line extended, it could only carry out the obligations of its charter by receiving and delivering to each elevator whatever
grain might be consigned to it, and it is idle to say such obligation can
be evaded by the claim that such delivery has not been the custom or
usage of respondent. It can be permitted to establish no custom inconsistent with the spirit and object of its charter.
It is claimed by counsel that the charter of respondent authorizes it
to make such contracts and regulations as might be necessary in the
transaction of its business. But certainly we cannot suppose the legislature intended to authorize the making of such rules or contracts as
would defeat the very object it had in view in granting the charter.
The company can make such rules and contracts as it pleases not inconsistent with its duties as a common carrier, but it can go no further,
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and any general language which its charter may contain must necessarily be construed with that limitation. In the case of the City of Chisago 'v. Rumpt, 45 Ill. 94, this court held a clause in the charter giving
the common council the right to control and regulate the business of
slaughtering animals did not authorize the city to create a monopoly of
the business under pretence of regulating and controlling it.
It is unnecessary to speak particularly of the rule adopted by the
company in reference to the transportation of grain. What we have said
in regard to the contract applies equally to the rule.
The principle that a railway company can make no injurious or arbitrary discrimination between individuals, in its dealings with the public,
not only commends itself to our reason and sense of justice, but is sustained by adjudged cases. In England, a contract which admitted to
the door of a station within the yard of a railroad company a certain
omnibus, and excluded another omnibus, was held' void: Marriott v.
L. and S. Railroad Co., I C. B. N. S. 499 (87 E. C. L. 498).
In Garton v. The Bristol and Exeter Railroad Company, 6 C. B.
N. S. 639 (95 E. C. L. 641), it was held that a contract with certain
ironmongers to carry their freight for a less price than that charged the
public was illegal, no good reason for the discrimination being shown.
In Crouch v. The London and Northwestern Railroad Company, 14
C. B. N. S. (78E. C. L. 254), it was held a railway company could not
make a regulaion for the conveyance of goods which in practice affected
one individual only.
In Sanford v. Railroad,24 Penn. 382, the court held that the power
given in the charter of a railway company to regulate the transportation of the road did not give the right to grant exclusive privileges to a
particular express company. The court say: "If the company possessed this power it might build up one set of men and destroy others;
advance one kind of business and break down another, and make even
religion and politics the tests in the distribution of its favors. The
rights of the people are not subject to any such corporate control."
We refer, also, to the Rogers Locomotive Works v. Erie Railroad Company, 5 C. E. Green 380, and State v. Hartford and New Haven Railway Company, 29 Conn. 538.
it is insisted by counsel for the respondent that, even if the relator
has just cause of complaint, he cannot resort to the writ of mandamus.
We are of opinion, however, that he can have an adequate remedy in no
other way, and that the writ will therefore lie.
The judgment of the court below in awarding a peremptory mandamus must be reversed, because it applies to the Galena division of the
respondent's road as well as the Wisconsin land Milwaukee divisions. If
it had applied only to the latter, we should have affirmed the judgment.
The parties have stipulqted that, in case of reversal, the case shall be
remanded, with leave to the relator to traverse the return. We therefore make no final order, but remand the case, with leave to both parties
to amend their pleadings if desired, in view of what has been said in this
Reversed and remanded.
opinion.
We have hesitated about publishing
the foregoing opinion, on account of

its great length and the very limited
interest in the particular questions deci-
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ded. But our own conviction of the
importance of the principle involved
has finally overcome that reluctance.
It has long seemed to us, that unless the
railways can be held to that impartiality
and fairness in the performance of their
public duty, in the transportation of
freight, the business of the country will
finally be thrown into inextricable confusion. Competition, we know, may be
carried to such an extreme, as for a
time at least, to produce great perplexity' but that is one of the
unavoidable evils connected with the
case of otherwise unendurable monopoly.
The selfishness and want of principle in
man is such, that he will adopt any
course which promises the greatest
advantage to his own business, altogether regardless of consequences to
others. The only salutary and reliable
check upon this overmastering tyranny
is to be found in free competition. So
long as competition is open to all, upon
equal terms, there is no serious danger
of any great oppression in the conduct
of business. But the only mode in
which this can be maintained, in a
country dependent upon railway transportation, is to compel the railway to
exercise absolute impartiality towards
all who desire accommodation. Unless
this rule is rigidly enforced in spite of
all subterfuges and evasions, there will
be no security. We shall all be placed
at the mercy of the most enterprising
and the most reckless. It is easy for
such men to bind the railway companies
to such terms of transportation, as shall
absolutely silence all possible competition. It is not that any one desires
competition to be carried to any destructive extent. There is no danger of this,
and wiU be no necessity for it, so long
as the field is kept open to all. Shrewd
men will do business upon fair terms,
so long as they remain exposed at every
moment to the introduction of a rival
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establishment. But the moment all
such restraint is removed, the best of
men will be in great danger, unconsciously, of trespassing upon the rights
of others.
"We know that in England these questions are) at the present time, ruled
almost exclusively by statutory enactments. And some of the English
judges seem to suppose, that independently of statutory provisions, it might
not be in the power of the courts to
compel railway companies to serve all
who employ them, upon the same terms;
and to serve all who applied, without
discrimination as to time or terms, to
the extent of their means. But this
doubt, we suppose, must rest more upon
the remedy than the right. We understand, that by the common law of
England common carriers are bound to
carry for all who desire to employ them,
and upon reasonable terms. This may
not absolutely imply that they shall
carry for all upon precisely the same
terms. For common carriers may
sometimes choose, for a short period and
to accomplish a particular result, to
carry for much less than a fair and
reasonable compensation. But unless
there is some exceptional case, we must
conclude that the price must be the same
to all for equal service. Any other rule
upon railways would become absolutely
intolerable. But in England, we
believe, the remedy by mandamus has
never been applied to this class of cases,
or if so, not except under very exceptional circumstances. But we cannot
but admire the resolute determination
manifested in the foregoing cases to apply such a remedy as will effectually
cure the evil, which, it must be con-.
fessed, an action at common law does
but imperfectly, and which a mandamus
does meet effectually.
I. F. R.

KAY v. THOMSON.

Supreme Court of .Nev Brunswick.
KAY v. THOMSON.
In an action against a surgeon for negligence and unskilfulness, in consequence
of whick the plaintiff lost his hands and feet, and where the evidence is conflicting,
medical men called as scientific witnesses to give their opinions, cannot be asked
questions, the answers to which involve the point which the jury have to determine, viz. : the negligence, &c., of the defendant; as, to what they would attribute
the loss of the plaintiff's hands and feet.
As a general rule, where improper evidence has been received after objection,
tke party prejudiced by it has a right to a new trial.
Where defendant died after verdict, and pending a motion for a new trial on
his behalf, the ordering the new trial was suspended to enable the plaintiff to
apply to the court to impose terms on making the rule absolute.
THIs was an action against the defendant for negligence and unskilfulness as a surgeon in his attendance on the plaintiff, whereby, it was
alleged, the plaintiff had suffered great and unnecessary pain, and had
lost his hands and feet, and been prevented from continuing a profitable
employment in which he was engaged, as superintendent of a coppermine.
At the first trial of the cause it appeared that the plaintiff was employed as superintendent and manager of a copper-mine, at a place called
Jetite, at a salary of £350 sterling per year, to be increased to £450 ; that
in going to his residence from the village of Maguadavic on the night
of the 23d December 1865, he lost his way in the snow, qnd was very
severely frost-bitten in his hands and feet; that the defendant (who
lived about nine miles distant), was sent for the next day, and attended
the plaintiff, dressing his hands and feet, and giving directions for his
treatment; that the plaintiff suffered great pain from the injuries, and
frequently sent for the defendant during the next twelve days ; that the
defendant sent him medicine, &c., from time to time, but did not visit
him again till the 6th January, when he gave some further directions
as to his treatment. Between that time and the 18th January, the
plaintiff sent for the defendant several times. On the 18th the
defendant again visited the plaintiff, and found his bands and feet in a
state of gangrene: the fingers were quite dead, and only connected with
the hands by the ligaments and tendons, and the metacarpal bones were
protruding nearly half an inch. On this occasion, the defendant cut
off the plaintiff's fingers and toes by merely severing the tendons. The
plaintiff's sufferings continued after this, and he sent for the defendant
two or three times, but as he did not go to him, the plaintiff on the
28th January employed another surgeon, who amputated his hands at
the wrist, and a part of his feet. The defendant's contention at the
trial was, that the plaintiff's hands and feet were so completely frozen,
that all vitality was destroyed, and no skill could have saved them, and
that he knew this when he first saw the plaintiff; that his more frequent
attendance would have been of no service, as he could have done no
more than he did by prescribing poultices, &c., and giving directions
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for the plaintiff's treatment; that though amputation might have been
performed on the 18th January, it could not have been performed
sooner, because the line of demarcation between the parts superficially frozen and the dead parts was not defined until then, and he
considered it advisable to wait about ten days longer, to see how far the
granulations (which were then forming) would extend down the hand,
in order to save as.much of the hands as possible; and this, he said,
could not properly be known at the time the amputation was performed.
A number of medical witnesses were examined on both sides, as to
whether the freezing of the plaintiff's hands and feet was superficial or
entire, and, if the latter, whether with proper treatment his hands and
feet could have been saved; also, whether more frequent visits to the
plaintiff were necessary, and whether the amputation should have been
performed at an earlier period. The evidence on these points was very
conflicting. The jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff for $25,000
damages, and found, in answer to a question left by the judge, that
under any circumstances the plaintiff would have lost a portion of his
fingers (as far as the second joint). That verdict was set aside for the
improper rejection of evidence and for excessive damages. On the
second trial a greater number of medical witnesses were examined on
the part of the defendant, but the jury did not agree. The case was
tried a third time in August 1869, on substantially the same evidence
as before, and the plaintiff obtained a verdict for $9000 damages. A
rule nisi was granted to set aside this verdict on the ground of the improper admission of evidence; that the verdict was against evidence; and
excessive damages.

D. S. Kerr and Grimmer showed cause against the 'rule in Hilary
term last, and S. R. TWomson was heard in support of it.
C. J., delivered the judgment of the court:The evidence objected to in this case was that given by the medical men,
who, not having any personal knowledge of the case, were called as
scientific witnesses to give their opinions, in the nature of experts. The
objections taken were as to the form and substance of the questions put,
and as to the answers these witnesses were allowed to give.
This description of evidence is founded, not on the personal observation of the witness, but on the case itself as proved by other witnesses
on the trial; and when scientific men are called as witnesses, they
cannot give their opinions as to the general merits of the cause, but
only their opinions on some question of science raised by the facts proved.
It is objected here, that the witnesses were asked, and were allowed to
give their opinions, on the very point which the jury were to decide.
Folkes v. Okadd, 3 Doug. 157,.may be considered the earliest leading
case on this subject. It was followed by others; and perhaps some of
them are not entirely reconcilable as to the strictly proper form of the
question, and the extent to which the witness may be interrogated. in
Jamen v. Drinl.dd, 12 Mloore 157, PARK. J., speaking of nautical
witnesses giving their opinions in eases for running down ships, says
"They ought not to say that they consider the fault to have been either
on the one side or the other." And GASELEE, J., in the same case says :
RITCHIE,
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"I am clearly of opinion, that a scientific person, called as a witness, is
not entitled to give his opinion as to the merits of a case, but only as to
the facts as proved by other witnesses." The cases of S,.zs v. Brown,
9 C. & P. 601; Fenwick v. Bell, 1 0. & K. 312; and Brown v.B rowmn,
Law R. 1 Prob. & Div. 49, may also be referred to.
But we are relieved from a critical examination of these cases, because
in .McNaughten'sCase, 10 C. & Fin. 200, the House of Lords submitted
to the judges for their opinion a question which entirely covers the
point now in contest before us. The question is in these words:Can
a medical man conversant *ith the disease of insanity, who never saw
the prisoner previous to the trial, but who was present during the whole
trial and the examination of all'the witnesses, be asked his opinion as
to the state of the risoner's mind at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime; or, his opinion whether the prisoner was conscious at the
time of doing the act that he was acting contrary to law; or, whether
he was acting under any, and what, delusion at the time."
The answer delivered by TINDAL, 0. J., was as follows :-" We think
the medical man, under the circumstances supposed, cannot in strictness
be asked his opinion in the terms above stated, because each of these
questions involves the determination of the truth of the facts deposed to,
which it is for the jury to decide; and the questions are not mere
questions upon a matter of science, in which case such evidence is
admissible. But where the facts are admitted, or not disputed, and the
question becomes" substantially one of science only, it may be -convenient to allow the question to be put in that general form, though
the same cannot be insisted on as a matter of right."
This was received and acted on by the House of Lords, and must, as
the decision of the highest appellate tribunal in the nation, bind all
inferior courts.
However difficult or inconvenient in practice, it may be to propound
questions or to frame answers so as to bring the examination strictly
within the limits so laid down, the burthen is on the party offering
such testimony, and from it be cannot escap6. We have, with great
labor, investigated the learned judge's notes of the trial, extending over
some 250 pages of foolscap; and we regret to have discovered, in many
instances, clear departures from the prescribed rifle, both in the questions proposed and answers given.
The question at issue in this cause was, whether the defendant had
been guilty of neglect in the discharge of his professional duties in his
attendance on the plaintiff; and the facts were neither admitted, nor
uncontradicted; the evidence of the medical witnesses being extremely
contradictory.
It will only be necessary to refer to a feW of the questions objected
to, by way of illustration. Thus, Dr. Gove is asked: "What reliance,
in a case like the present, can be put on the report or description of a
messenger to the medical man?" This was clearly not a question of
science.
Another question was :.-" From the plaintiffs statement, and the'
statement of the witnesses you have heard, how do you account for the
.destruction of the plaintiff's fingers and toes; or, what caused their
Aestruction?" The answer to this was :-" I think long-continued sti-

KAY v. THOMSON.

mulation of the raw surface produced the destruction or the death of
the parts."
But not content with this, the witness is pressed still further by the
following question :-" From the evidence before the court, to what do
you ascribe the loss of the plaintiff's fingers and toes T"
His answer was :-" I should say, first to non-attendance of the
defendant; over stimulation of the inflamed parts." Here, the witness
undertakes to determine one of the most important questions of fact
in controversy, and in effect, precisely what the jury were to decide on
the merits.
.Again, Dr. Black was asked the following question :-" From the
evidence, to what would you ascribe the loss of the plaintiff's limbs?"
His answer was:-" I would ascribe it, first, to frost-bite; second, to
neglect in attendance; third, to want of proper treatment.
Nothing could be more objectionable than this answer, if we follow,
as we are bound to, the rule laid down by the House of Lords.
The evidence thus pressed in was material, and might have had a
most importaroj effect on the minds of the jury. There were only three
medical men examined on the part of the plaintiff; and Doctors Gove
and Black were material and important witnesses, on whom he mainly
relied. The jury, for aught we know, may have adopted their conclusions thus stated on the merits, without themselves at all weighing the
facts and opinions in evidence on which those conclusions were based,
and without determining whether those facts and opinions warranted
the conclusions stated; and which conclusions it was the duty of the
jury, and the jury alone, wholly unbiassed, to arrive at.
The law with regard to the right of a party to a new trial where improper evidence has been received against him, is so clear and has been
so often acted on in this court, that it is hardly necessary to cite authorities in support of it. In the case of Bailey v. Haines, 19 Law J. Q.
B. 78, where evidence was improperly received, but the jury professed
to have found their verdict independent of such evidence, Lord DEN.
xAN expressed, as the opinion of himself and the rest of the judges,
that if evidence was wrongly received, it was quite immaterial that the
jury professed to have found their verdict independently of it. In
Wright v. Doe dem. 2a4t am, 7 A. & E. 330, the law is thus explicitly
stated by Lord DENMAN: "Sir F. Pollock suggested that we might act
upon the example of the Common Pleas in Doe v. Tyler, 6 Bingh. 561,
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